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The Ins and “Outs” of Domestic Forum Selection 
Clauses in ICSID Arbitral Disputes 
Carleigh E. Zeman† 
Abstract: Bilateral investment treaties, known as BITs, are treaties 
between two nations that include a set of protections to encourage 
investment between the two signatories.  Among these 
protections, BITs often include an arbitration provision to allow 
states to seek a remedy in front of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID] or another 
international arbitral tribunal.  However, parties may waive the 
right to arbitrate certain claims, effectively superseding the 
international treaty, if a State and foreign investor sign a private 
contract containing a forum selection clause.  Often, these clauses 
call for initial or exclusive resolution of claims in the State’s 
domestic courts.  ICSID tribunals have held that such clauses may 
eliminate the tribunal’s ability to hear part or all of an 
international investment dispute, undermining the purpose and 
effectiveness of BITs.  Further, because foreign investors often 
face prejudice and other disadvantages in State domestic courts, 
these investors may effectively be denied any legal remedy.  This 
article seeks to explore the inherent contradiction in allowing 
parties to supersede an international treaty via private contract, 
the strategies an investor may use to evade an unfavorable forum 
selection clause once signed, as well as the ways in which 
arbitrators can respond to this contradiction to ensure a legal 
remedy for foreign investors. 
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I. Introduction 
Bilateral investment treaties are agreements between two 
nations, usually a developed nation and a developing nation, which 
include a set of rules and protections designed to encourage 
investors in the developed nation to invest in the economy and 
infrastructure of the developing nation.1  One such protection 
typically included in these treaties is an arbitration provision that 
allows the investor to seek a remedy in front of an international 
arbitral tribunal.2  A remedy from an international arbitral institution 
is preferable to ordinary domestic adjudication because generally, 
an arbitral hearing will take place in a disinterested, third-party State 
in front of an international panel of impartial arbitrators.3  The 
 
 1 See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on 
Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 105, 
105–06 (1986). 
 2 Id. at 109–10; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INV. DIV, 
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTERPRISE AFF’S, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 9 (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/32V2-2PT8] [hereinafter OECD SURVEY] (“Over time, [Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement] through international arbitration has become a common feature of 
investment treaties – only 108 treaties, or 6.5% of the sample, do not provide for 
international arbitration.”). 
 3 See Number of Arbitrators and Method of Their Appointment – ICSID Convention 
Arbitration, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS. (“ICSID”), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Number-of-Arbitrators-and-Method-of-
Appointment-Convention-Arbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/P6BF-P2DN] (last visited 
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arbitral rules in such proceedings are accessible, often in different 
languages,4 and the final award is enforceable and binding against 
states that have joined the New York Convention.5 
The right to seek arbitration, however, may be signed away by 
parties in a private contract.  This occurs when the private contract 
between the State or State entity and the foreign investor contains a 
forum selection clause, usually for the domestic courts of the 
developing nation.6  This is problematic for the investor, who may 
find itself seriously disadvantaged in those foreign courts because 
of a language barrier, lack of local counsel, simple prejudice, or any 
combination of those factors. 
All three factors seem to be present in the case of Dirk Herzig 
as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of Unionmatex 
Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan,7 an ongoing dispute 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”).  In 2008, Unionmatex won a public tender for 
contracts for construction of grain mills and bakeries in 
Turkmenistan totaling € 144 million.8  However, after a series of 
alleged breaches on the part of the Turkmen government, 
negotiations broke down and construction stopped.9 
 
Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Number of Arbitrators]. 
 4 See, e.g., ICSID Convention in Other Languages, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Convention-in-other-
Languages.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q2K3-ZY55] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (providing 
copies of the ICSID Convention in twenty different languages). 
 5 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 7, 1959) 
[hereinafter New York Convention]; see also Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, 
Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand 
Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 88 (2005). 
 6 See, e.g., Dirk Herzig as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of Unionmatex 
Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/35 [hereinafter 
Unionmatex] (showing how a German company may have signed away its right to bring 
certain claims under the arbitration and umbrella clauses of the Germany-Turkmenistan 
BIT by signing a private contract containing a forum selection clause for the domestic 
courts of Turkmenistan). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Jack Ballantyne, Turkmenistan Faces Two New ICSID Claims, GLOB. ARB. REV. 
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1175731/turkmenistan-faces-
two-new-icsid-claims [https://perma.cc/9KSS-FJFN]. 
 9 See id. (alleging that Turkmenistan’s breaches included failure to provide visa and 
customs clearances, make agreed advance payments, provide access to gas, water, and 
electricity at worksites, and provide acceptable groundwater levels at the work sites). 
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In accordance with the forum selection clause contained in the 
construction contracts, Unionmatex sought a remedy in the 
Turkmen domestic courts, but received only “farcical court 
proceedings”10 rank with alleged due process violations that, not 
surprisingly, resulted in a decision in favor of the Turkmen 
government.11  Unionmatex filed a request for ICSID arbitration 
hearings in late 2018, but Turkmenistan has objected to the arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute.12  To add insult to injury, 
Unionmatex, a German company with a successful history of 96 
years in business,13 filed for bankruptcy in 2014 as a result of its 
dealings with Turkmenistan.14 
If the tribunal finds that it cannot hear Unionmatex’s case 
because of a forum selection clause that grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Turkmen courts, then the German company will 
have no remedy.  Even more concerning, should ICSID find no 
jurisdiction, is the reality that parties may supersede an international 
treaty via a private contract, eliminating both parties’ right to seek 
a remedy for certain causes of action from an international arbitral 
tribunal.  This paper seeks to explore this contradiction, enumerate 
the issues inherent in hearing cases in the domestic courts of 
developing nations, and consider the options that investors15 and 
 
 10 Alison Ross, ICSID Claim in the Oven Against Turkmenistan, GLOB. ARB. REV. 
(Dec. 20, 2016), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1079152/icsid-claim-in-the-
oven-against-turkmenistan [https://perma.cc/DHB4-PPT7]. 
 11 See Ballantyne, supra note 8 (stating that the foreign investor was prevented from 
bringing a translator, that its local representative resigned from the case facing extreme 
pressure from the Turkmen government, and that its further filings either failed or were 
ignored). 
 12 Case Details, Dirk Herzig as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of 
Unionmatex Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/18/35), 
ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/18/35 
(click “Procedural Details” tab) [https://perma.cc/M7YT-SZ83] (last visited Nov. 24, 
2020) (reporting that the Respondent filed a request to address the objections to jurisdiction 
as a preliminary question on Sept. 13, 2019 and again on Sept. 28, 2020). 
 13 Ross, supra note 10. 
 14 See Luke Eric Peterson & Zoe Williams, Turkmenistan Update: Award Rendered 
in Garanti Koza’s BIT Arbitration; German Investor Files a Notice of Dispute, INV. ARB. 
REP. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/turkmenistan-update-award-
rendered-in-garanti-kozas-bit-arbitration-german-investor-files-a-notice-of-dispute/ 
[https://perma.cc/LY7D-CZ87]. 
 15 Note that the term “investor” as it applies to investment disputes does not 
exclusively refer to a single individual investor, nor does “investment” exclusively refer 
to cash contributions. More commonly, “investor” refers to a corporation or group of 
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arbitrators can pursue to prevent foreign parties from becoming 
trapped by problematic forum selection clauses. 
The most obvious solution is, of course, to not sign a contract 
that contains an unfavorable forum selection clause.  However, for 
parties that do not appreciate the significance of such clauses, feel 
they lack bargaining power to negotiate the contract, or 
overestimate the reliability of the courts in the foreign jurisdiction 
they submit themselves to, there may still be ways to get a dispute 
in front of an arbitral tribunal. 
Depending on the specific language of the clause, a tribunal may 
interpret a weakly-worded forum selection clause as being limited 
in either scope or jurisdiction, thus exempting some or all causes of 
action from the agreement.16  The doctrine forum non conveniens 
may be used to argue that a case should move to a more convenient 
forum than the one identified by the forum selection clause.17  
Finally, arbitrators can address the problem by treating the right to 
seek dispute resolution in front of an arbitral tribunal as non-
waivable, or by introducing a standard by which to measure the 
equitability of a forum selection clause.  Each of these solutions 
comes with its respective strengths and weaknesses, as explored 
below. 
Part II provides background information on bilateral investment 
treaties, their history, and purposes.  Part III describes international 
arbitration as a legal mechanism and provides more specific 
information on ICSID and the requirements for ICSID jurisdiction.  
Part IV examines the disadvantages that a foreign investor might 
encounter if forced to adjudicate an investment claim in the 
domestic courts of a foreign State.  Part V explores the various 
solutions that both lawyers defending investors and arbitrators faced 
 
shareholders. In the case of Unionmatex, the “investor” was a construction company and 
the “investment” was building mills and grain factories in Turkmenistan for the benefit of 
the Turkmen population. See Melissa María Valdez García, The Path Towards Defining 
“Investment” in ICSID Investor-State Arbitrations: The Open-Ended Approach, 18 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 27, 30 (2018) (noting that many BITs and trade agreements with 
investment chapters have broad, nonexclusive definitions for investment terms). 
 16 See generally John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 1791 (2019) (elaborating on how U.S. courts interpret specific terms and phrases 
contained in choice-of-forum clauses in determining the scope and exclusivity of such 
clauses). 
 17 See Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 
U.S. 422, 428 (2007). 
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with an investment claim can use to prevent the miscarriage of 
justice in ICSID cases.  Finally, Part VI concludes this piece. 
II. Bilateral Investment Treaties 
A bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) is a treaty involving two 
States, often a capital-exporting (developed) and capital-importing 
(developing) state.18  BITs tend to be reciprocal, meaning that the 
rights and responsibilities of the treaty apply equally to investors of 
both States.19  These treaties deal almost exclusively with 
investment-related issues, extending a common core of substantive 
promises to investors, with the term “investment” typically defined 
broadly.20  Since the creation of the first BIT in 1959,21 the 
instrument has grown in popularity with over 2,500 broadly similar 
agreements currently in existence.22  The United States is no 
exception; since the 1980s, the country has signed over 40 BITs, 
primarily with developing nations.23  Until recently, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, better known as NAFTA,24 also 
 
 18 Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct 
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 402 (2011). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. at 401 (citing the 1959 treaty between Germany and Pakistan as the first 
BIT). But see John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the 
Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 327 (explaining that BITs were preceded 
by Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, which worked similarly to protect the 
interests of U.S. nationals doing business overseas). 
 22 Yackee, supra note 18, at 401. 
 23 The United States has signed BITs with Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (Zaire), Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Georgia, Grenada, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, the 
Republic of the Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad 
& Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan. United States Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.state.gov/investment-
affairs/bilateral-investment-treaties-and-related-agreements/united-states-bilateral-
investment-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/AKC5-2SHU]. 
 24 The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), also known as the “New 
NAFTA,” entered into force on July 1, 2020.  Under the USMCA’s Investment Chapter, 
investors from Canada or the United States will no longer have access to investor State 
dispute settlement mechanisms against those countries. Catherine Amirfar et al., From 
NAFTA to USMCA: Main Changes to the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System, 
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (May 7, 2020), https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/ 
2020/05/from-nafta-to-usmca-main-changes-to-the-investor [https://perma.cc/DC29-
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acted as a trilateral investment treaty between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico.25 
Three primary goals motivate nations to enter into BITs: foreign 
investment protection, market liberalization, and foreign market 
promotion.26  The first two goals work largely in the interest of the 
investors of the developed nation, while the third goal primarily 
benefits the investee developing nation.27  The “grand bargain” of 
BITs is that, if a developing nation enters into a BIT creating 
protections and a hospitable environment for foreign investors, the 
developing nation will benefit by receiving an increase of foreign 
capital invested in the State.28  The foreign investor then benefits by 
having access to previously inaccessible29 or high risk markets that 
it could not or did not feel comfortable investing in prior to the 
creation of the BIT.30  When the protections of BITs are either not 
enforced or simply “contracted around” by agreements between 
private parties, the concern is that the grand bargain comes undone; 
foreign investors no longer feel comfortable investing in the 
developing nation and the developing nation no longer enjoys the 
benefits of capital coming from foreign investors. 
III.  International Arbitration 
The word arbitration may send up red flags to readers who 
immediately think of big corporations sneaking arbitration clauses 
into fine print, forcing helpless customers to resolve disputes 
through the corporation’s specially created arbitration system.  
International arbitral tribunals, however, operate quite differently 
and may in fact provide a more equitable alternative to adjudication 
of international investment disputes in State courts. 
Established in 1966 by the ICSID Convention,31 ICSID is an 
 
SC4Y]. 
 25 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 74. 
 26 Id. at 68. 
 27 See id. at 75–77. 
 28 See id. at 77. 
 29 Id. at 76 (arguing that BITs facilitate the entry and operation of investments by 
inducing host countries to remove various impediments in their regulatory systems). 
 30 See id. at 77. 
 31 Formally known as the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention]. 
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independent dispute-settlement institution specifically devoted to 
international investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”).32  A 
dispute is typically heard by a panel of three arbitrators: one 
arbitrator chosen by each of the parties and a third arbitrator to serve 
as President of the Tribunal, either (1) agreed upon by both parties, 
or (2) appointed by the Secretary-General of ICSID.33  The tribunal 
operates very much like a court, hearing evidence and legal 
arguments from both parties before reaching its binding, 
enforceable decision.34  While ICSID exclusively hears investment 
disputes, parties entering into international contracts may (and often 
do) include an arbitration clause for one of the dozens of arbitral 
institutions that operate around the globe which are competent to 
hear all claims arising out of international disputes.35 
Resolving an international investment dispute in arbitration 
provides many advantages over having a dispute heard in domestic 
courts.  The first and most obvious is that arbitration presents an 
opportunity for parties to have a dispute settled in a neutral forum.36  
Parties in arbitration are encouraged to choose a third-party forum 
(i.e., not the home State of either party) and most institutions require 
their arbitrators to sign a declaration of independence and 
impartiality.37  Arbitrations tend to be resolved more quickly than 
disputes in court—the average length of arbitral proceedings is 
twenty-four months38 and there is no system for appeal.39 
 
 32 About ICSID, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/E9LC-2GZS] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
 33 See Number of Arbitrators, supra note 3. 
 34 See About ICSID, supra note 32. 
 35 Juris International - Dispute Resolution Centres, INT’L TRADE CTR., 
http://www.intracen.org/itc/trade-support/arbitration-and-mediation/ 
[https://perma.cc/XG9M-M7QY] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing 175 institutions 
around the globe that offer commercial arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and other 
alternative dispute resolution services). 
 36 Guy Robin, The Advantages and Disadvantages of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 2014 INT’L BUS. L.J. 131, 138 (2014). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 137. 
 39 ICSID has no formal system of appeal. However, if a party believes that the 
tribunal has erred, it may request a supplementary decision, rectification, revision, or 
annulment. See Post-Award Remedies - ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Post-Award-Remedies-Convention-
Arbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/FQS9-VNC7] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).  For 
comparison, civil cases in the U.S. district court have a median length of 27 months from 
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Further, the process itself is tailored to meet businesses’ needs.40  
For example, for businesses who want to keep scientific know-how 
or a strategic interest out of the public eye, arbitration is a private, 
confidential method to resolve business disputes.41  The lack of 
interference by the press and the public allows the parties to focus 
on the merits of the dispute and thus preserve future business 
relations.42  Finally, arbitral awards are much more easily 
enforceable than judgments from domestic courts, as the New York 
Convention provides that an arbitral award may be recognized and 
enforced in the domestic courts of any of the 166 signatories to the 
Convention.43  ICSID arbitral awards are particularly attractive to 
investors because, since ICSID is affiliated with the World Bank 
Group, a host State is more likely to comply with an ICSID award 
as failure to comply may jeopardize the State’s access to World 
Bank funding or international credit generally.44  That is not to say 
that arbitration is a faultless alternative to international litigation, 
but that it provides a method to avoid many of the problems 
presented by adjudication of such cases in domestic courts, as 
 
filing to the start of a trial, with roughly 10% of cases pending for more than three years.  
See CONG. RES. SERVS., LAWSUITS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: BASIC FEDERAL 
COURT PROCEDURE AND TIMELINES 1 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11349.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8A76-BLCC].  An appeal to a federal circuit court on average takes 
another ten months. See U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS SUMMARY – 12-MONTH 
PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2020 2 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/data_tables/fcms_na_appsumary0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY9C-Z5ZK]. 
Thus, on average, assuming two parties commence an action on the same date, the party 
who submits a dispute to international arbitration will have its dispute completely resolved 
before a party who submits its dispute to a U.S. district court has even begun trial.  
 40 Robin, supra note 36, at 136. 
 41 Id.; Publication of ICSID Decisions and Awards with the Parties’ Consent, ICSID 
(May 5, 2010), https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/publication-
icsid-decisions-and-awards-parties-consent [https://perma.cc/Y2RV-SHBD] [hereinafter 
Publication of ICSID Decisions] (noting that consent of both parties is required for 
publication of ICSID decisions). 
 42 Robin, supra note 36, at 136. 
 43 New York Convention, supra note 5. The New York Convention’s website reports 
that, as of 2020, 166 nations are party to the convention.  See Contracting States – List of 
Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ 
list+of+contracting+states [https://perma.cc/5JTV-6X3C] (last visited Dec. 15, 2020). 
 44 Glossary: Umbrella Clause, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L., 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-519-0939?transitionType=Default&context 
Data=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true [https://perma.cc/FSZ7-GH6K?type=image] (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2020). 
482 N.C. J. INT'L L.  [Vol. XLVI 
discussed infra Part IV. 
A. ICSID Jurisdiction 
As of 2020, 155 States have ratified the ICSID Convention.45  
Article 25(1) of the Convention provides: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State 
(or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State[.]46 
Article 25(3) of the Convention adds that consent by a 
constituent subdivision or agency of a State requires approval of that 
State, unless the State notifies the Centre that no such approval is 
required.47  However, signing the ICSID convention on its own 
cannot amount to consent to ICSID jurisdiction by the parties in an 
ICSID dispute, since an ICSID arbitral dispute is not between 
States, but between a host State and a foreign investor.48  Therefore, 
it has become common practice to consent to ICSID jurisdiction 
through a BIT.49  Ninety-three percent of BITs contain language 
about ISDS, with ninety percent of those treaties mentioning ICSID 
as either the exclusive or a permissible forum for ISDS.50 
In addition to the jurisdictional requirements of Article 25(1) 
and (3) and consent via a BIT, international arbitral tribunals also 
have limited subject matter, or rationae materiae, jurisdiction.51  
 
 45 For a complete list of signatory and contracting states, see About ICSID: Database 
of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/member-
states/database-of-member-states [https://perma.cc/Q2T2-Q68C] (last visited Dec. 12, 
2020) (reporting that 163 countries have signed the ICSID Convention and that 155 
countries have ratified it). 
 46 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, art. 25(1). 
 47 Id. art. 25(3). 
 48 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. (“UNCTAD”), DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 2.3 CONSENT TO 
ARBITRATION 17 (2003), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edmmisc23 
2add2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E95-ANJD]. 
 49 Id. 
 50 OECD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 18–19 (showing that approximately 90% of 
treaties containing ISDS provisions mention ICSID, while another 60% mention ad hoc 
tribunals under UNCITRAL rules). 
 51 Katia Yannaca-Small, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 
2006/03: Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, OECD PUBL’G 
3 (Oct. 2006), https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/WP-
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This means that an arbitral tribunal is not necessarily competent to 
hear any claim arising out of an investment agreement.  Rather, the 
tribunal may only hear treaty claims—those claims arising from the 
violation of protections guaranteed by the BIT.52  For investors, this 
typically means bringing an expropriation claim (as this is the most 
common protection afforded by BITs, often earning its own clause 
in a BIT),53 or a claim for violation of the standard(s) of protection 
guaranteed by the BIT.54  The most common standards contained in 
BITs include: protection against expropriation, fair and equitable 
treatment, national treatment, and most-favored nation treatment.55  
Therefore, under ordinary circumstances, a foreign investor cannot 
simply sue a State for breach of contract if the State fails to fulfill 
its obligations under the contract.  Instead, the foreign investor must 
characterize its harm either as an expropriation or as a failure to 
meet the standard(s) of protection as guaranteed by the BIT for an 
ICSID tribunal to have jurisdiction to hear the claim.56 
B. Umbrella Clauses 
While early models of BITs typically only provided for 
protection against expropriation, more recent BITs tend to allow 
parties to bring a greater variety of claims under the BIT.57  It has 
become common practice among certain nations to include an 
umbrella clause in their BITs.58  Umbrella clauses are broadly-
written clauses that act as a catch-all provision to pursue claims 
 
2006_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC4A-BETR]. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See generally OECD SURVEY, supra note 2 (noting throughout the report that 
information about ISDS remedies in BITs is typically found either in an expropriation 
clause or in a separate ISDS clause). 
 54 Ezgi Ceren Aydoğmuş, Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BIT”) and Standards of 
Protection in Energy Sector, HERDEM ATT’YS AT L. (Aug. 2, 2015), available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=91a5d19b-63e5-427d-ba45-
b3f7a533fea2 [https://perma.cc/K79C-P9JH]. 
 55 See id. (providing more information on these standards and the different levels of 
protection they guarantee). 
 56 Yannaca-Small, supra note 51, at 3. 
 57 See OECD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 8 (“Of low frequency in the sample is a first 
category of treaties (mostly early treaties) that only provide access to domestic courts, and 
only to bring claims arising under the expropriation clause.”). 
 58 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 51, at 5–6. 
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where a host State’s actions might not normally breach the BIT.59  
While violating a contract would not ordinarily invoke treaty 
protection under international law, the presence of an umbrella 
clause in a BIT can elevate a contract claim to the level of a treaty 
claim, meaning that an investor should in theory be able to bring a 
breach-of-contract claim before an international arbitral body like 
ICSID.60 
Of the roughly 2,500 BITs currently in existence, approximately 
forty percent contain an umbrella clause.61  Certain nations tend to 
favor the inclusion of umbrella clauses in their BITs, including 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany.62  
The language and appearance of umbrella clauses varies,63 but an 
example appears in Article 8(2) of the Germany-Turkmenistan BIT: 
Each Contracting State shall observe any other obligation that it 
may have entered into with regard to investments in its territory 
by nationals or companies of the other Contracting State.64 
Because a contract between a German corporation and the 
Turkmen State (or vice-versa) fits within the broad language of 
Article 8(2), an ICSID tribunal should in theory have jurisdiction to 
hear both traditional BIT claims as well as any other claims arising 
out of investor-State contracts. 
IV. Issues of Domestic Adjudication 
A. Prejudice Against Foreign Parties 
Lawyers and legislators have long recognized a certain “home 
field advantage” for those parties having their case heard on their 
own turf.  The American government recognized this issue early in 
the nation’s history and addressed it by including a provision in the 
 
 59 Glossary: Umbrella Clause, supra note 44. 
 60 Id. 
 61 OECD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 5. 
 62 Id. (reporting that while certain nations tend to favor umbrella clauses, others, such 
as France, Australia, Japan, and Canada, tend to draft BITs without umbrella clauses). 
 63 See id. at 4–5 (demonstrating several ways an umbrella clause might be phrased). 
 64 Treaty Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Government of Turkmenistan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, Germ.-Turkmenistan, art. 8(2), opened for signature Aug. 28, 1997 
(entered into force Feb. 19, 2001), (quoting the English translation of the BIT, available 
at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/italaw11244.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8CAY-QZU6]). 
2021 FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN ICSID DISPUTES 485 
U.S. Constitution allowing diverse parties to file in federal court 
under diversity jurisdiction65 to prevent bias towards the local party 
in state court.66  If the framers of the Constitution were worried 
about preference in the courts for Americans from one state over 
Americans from a neighboring state, imagine how the problem 
becomes exacerbated when the parties hail from different nations.  
Additionally, because all ICSID cases by definition arise from a 
dispute with a State or State-owned entity, the battle is not just 
between citizens of different nations; it is a battle between a foreign 
citizen and the government in whose courts it is seeking a remedy.67 
In addition to overcoming the simple prejudice of being an 
“other,” investors who do business with developing nations may be 
forced to bear the burden of political tensions working against them 
in the courtroom.  A prime illustration of this issue occurred in the 
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  In 1979, Islamic 
organizations overthrew the American-backed Shah of Iran and 
installed a theocratic government that was openly anti-American.68  
A large number of American businesses and investors had contracts 
with the Iranian government that they did not or could not perform 
after the revolution.69  Many American companies were forced to 
leave their assets behind or had them seized by the Iranian 
government and in retaliation, the United States seized any Iranian 
assets that it could.70  This created a legal standoff; parties from the 
 
 65 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies 
between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between 
Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.”). 
 66 Linda S. Mullenix, Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction: Is There 
Diversity After Death, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1012 n.7 (1985) (“The often articulated 
rationale for diversity jurisdiction is to prevent state court prejudice against out-of-state 
litigants.”) 
 67 See Robin, supra note 36, at 138. 
 68 See Janet Afary, Iranian Revolution, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
event/Iranian-Revolution [https://perma.cc/Y4YQ-FJP7] (last updated Sept. 20, 2019). 
 69 See, e.g., Am. Bell Int’l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The action arises from the recent revolution in Iran and its impact upon 
contracts made with the ousted Imperial Government of Iran[.]”); Harris Corp. v. Nat’l 
Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 70 See Suzanne Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, IRAN PRIMER, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-economy [https://perma.cc/PGW3-
BKEP] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“Iran’s constraints intensified after the November 
1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, when Washington froze approximately $11 
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United States were unwilling to file suit in Iran and vice versa, 
because parties from both nations recognized the extreme political 
prejudice they would face in the other nation’s courts. 
The problem was only resolved by the creation of the U.S.-Iran 
Claims Tribunal, an arbitral tribunal mediated by Algeria, a neutral 
third party, to ensure that parties from both nations could have their 
claims heard without prejudice by an independent, non-prejudicial 
tribunal—71 sound familiar? 
B. Lack of Access to Counsel 
For investors with enough capital and connections to expand to 
foreign markets, it may seem that finding legal counsel or 
representation to assist them in proceedings before domestic courts 
would not pose much of an issue.  However, it is the unfortunate 
reality that in some countries, lawyers may refuse to represent a 
party opposing the government in court.  This tends to be more 
prevalent in countries like Turkmenistan,72 where the head of state 
rules with relatively unlimited power, citizens may have limited 
access to information or free speech, and governments are known 
perpetrators of human rights violations.73 
In Unionmatex, the company alleged that when the project got 
behind schedule due to failures on the part of the Turkmen 
government, the officials onsite “appeared to fear political and 
personal consequences from their negligence and interference and 
therefore reported that Unionmatex was to blame.”74  The company 
was initially able to obtain local representation, but “it is alleged 
that its lawyer resigned in response to government pressure.”75 
Unionmatex is neither the first nor the only case in which a 
 
billion in Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions.”). 
 71 See About the Tribunal, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB., https://www.iusct.net/ 
Pages/Public/A-About.aspx [https://perma.cc/F75W-AA4F] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
 72 This paper will frequently use Turkmenistan as an example to show the issues 
inherent in adjudicating investment disputes in developing countries. That is not to say 
Turkmenistan is the only country where these problems exist or these issues are implicated. 
At least some of these issues will be present in any given case where claims are adjudicated 
in a remote, developing nation with a weak legal system. 
 73 See Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Award, ¶¶ 4.3.5–4.3.21 (July 2, 2013) (elaborating on the 
various reports providing evidence that Turkmenistan lacks an independent judiciary). 
 74 Ross, supra note 10. 
 75 Id. 
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foreign investor was unable to find local representation for its case 
in Turkmenistan.  The claimant in the 2013 ICSID case Kiliç Ĭnşaat 
Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan76 
alleged similar issues to those in Unionmatex: 
Claimant contends in its submissions that it was unable to find a 
single Turkmen lawyer who was willing to testify against the 
government of Turkmenistan.  It is said that, on each occasion the 
refusal was followed by the same explanation: a fear for the 
security of the lawyer and his/her family of reprisals by 
Respondent.  Claimant also submits it has communicated about 
this with other investors with claims against Respondent and 
understands that its experience is universal.77 
Even if an investor seeks to litigate its claim in a remote 
developing nation where the level of corruption does not rise quite 
to the level of that seen in Kiliç, the investor may still be 
disadvantaged by having to bring on local counsel to litigate.  An 
investor will be most comfortable working with a law firm with 
which it already has a strong business relationship and which is 
already familiar with the investor’s operations and needs, or 
alternatively, a firm with an office located nearby whose lawyers 
speak the investor’s language.  However, in cases adjudicated in far-
off developing countries, investors must settle for representation by 
local counsel with whom they may have no relationship or past 
dealings.78  In this situation, investors and their lawyers may run 
into linguistic and cultural barriers when communicating with local 
counsel, or may have no way of determining the quality or 
trustworthiness of counsel in the developing nation.79  Alternatively, 
in ICSID disputes, the investor may be able to use its ordinary go-
to law firm—if that firm has an international arbitration practice 
group—or at least be represented by a firm that specializes in 
international arbitration, has an office located near the investor, and 
 
 76 ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1. 
 77 Kiliç, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Award, at ¶ 4.3.12. 
 78 See, e.g., Steven C. Nelson, International Commercial Arbitration, 24 INT’L L. 
599, 602 (1990) (describing a case in which one party needed to involve local counsel on 
issues related to Barbados law). 
 79 See generally Anna Stolley Persky, The New World: Despite Globalization of the 
Economy, Lawyers Are Finding New Barriers to Practice on Foreign Soil, 97 A.B.A. J. 
34, 38 (2011) (explaining the difficulties of working with and finding qualified local 
counsel in international disputes). 
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speaks the investor’s language.80 
C. Lack of Access to Law 
In addition to the difficulty of finding counsel to represent them, 
investors may also run into difficulty finding out what the law of a 
developing nation is.  This problem may arise as early as the signing 
of the contract.  If the investor is presented with a choice-of-law 
clause for, say, Turkmen law, or a forum selection clause for the 
Turkmen courts (most likely submitting itself to Turkmen law),81  
the investor may have no way of figuring out what substantive law 
it has in fact bound itself to.82  This is not entirely the fault of the 
investor—translations of the laws of the developing nation might 
not be available in any widely-spoken language. 
Say, for example, that an investor is presented with a contract 
that selects Turkmen law and wants to research the law before 
signing.  The official language of Turkmenistan is Turkmen,83  and 
as such the constitution and all codes of law are written in 
Turkmen.84  Microsoft Translator currently offers translation 
 
 80 Many of the world’s top arbitration firms have offices located all over the world, 
especially in the wealthy, developed nations that investors in ICSID disputes tend to call 
home. See Best Law Firms for International Arbitration – Commercial, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., https://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/international-arbitration-commercial 
[https://perma.cc/C9CN-7RLX] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
 81 This is because a forum selection clause for one jurisdiction also tends to 
accompanied by a choice-of-law clause selecting the law of that jurisdiction. In the case 
that a contract includes a forum selection clause but fails to include a choice-of-law clause, 
the prevailing view is to apply the law of the forum. See Coyle, supra note 16, at 1793–94 
n.5 (2019). 
 82 Robin, supra note 36, at 138 (“A foreign company will be put at a disadvantage 
over the ‘home party’ when faced with a complex legal and court system; in these 
circumstances, it may be difficult for a foreign party to have access to information about 
the local law and this party may thus be impeded from fully grasping the risks that it is 
exposed to.”). 
 83 People and Society: Turkmenistan, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELL. AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html [https:// 
perma.cc/YJT8-V25G] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter People and Society] 
(reporting that Turkmen is the official language of Turkmenistan, with 72% of the 
population speaking the language). 
 84 See, e.g.¸ Türkmenistanyň Konstitusiýasy [Constitution of Turkmenistan], HUKUK 
MAGLUMATLARY MERKEZI [LEGAL INFO. CTR.], http://www.minjust.gov.tm/tm/ 
mmerkezi/doc_view.php?doc_id=8124 [https://perma.cc/QG2R-4PM3] (last updated 
Nov. 1, 2019). 
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between eighty world languages,85 but it does not offer translation 
of Turkmen.86  Google Translate just added Turkmen to its list of 
translatable languages in 2020.87  Fortunately, as Russian is 
Turkmenistan’s second most widely-spoken language,88 a variety of 
legal resources are also available in Russian and are thus more 
readily translatable, both by automatic web translation services and 
official translators.89 
If the investor wants an English translation of the Turkmen 
Code, Wolters Kluwer currently sells a hardcopy print version of 
the Code on its website.90  This publication is not an official English 
translation of the code, and the website description warns that there 
are parts of the law which are inconsistent depending on whether 
the Turkmen or Russian translation is used.91  This may be the best 
(and perhaps only) way for the investor to try to determine what the 
law of Turkmenistan is before submitting itself to the law in a 
contract.  Therefore, it may be difficult even for an investor who 
conducts due diligence or for a lawyer with experience in foreign 
legal research to figure out what the laws of certain remote, 
developing nations are.  Further, as can be seen from the dealings 
of foreign investors in Turkmenistan, laws on paper do not 
necessarily translate into laws in practice for developing nations 
with weak legal systems.92 
 
 85 Including two dialects of Klingon, a fictional language from the Star Trek 
universe. 
 86 See MICROSOFT TRANSLATOR, https://www.bing.com/translator [https://perma.cc/ 
65BA-GYRF] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
 87 Nick Statt, Google Translate Supports New Languages for the First Time in Four 
Years, Including Uyghur, VERGE (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2020/2/26/21154417/google-translate-new-languages-support-odia-tatar-turkmen-
uyghur-kinyarwanda [https://perma.cc/8TBQ-R92F]. 
 88 People and Society, supra note 83 (reporting Russian as Turkmenistan’s second-
most spoken language, with 12% of the population speaking the language). 
 89 See generally Индекс [Index], ЦЕНТР ПРАВ ИНФОРМАЦИИ [INFO. RTS. CTR.], 
http://www.minjust.gov.tm/ru/mmerkezi/index.php [https://perma.cc/428V-ZM5L] (last 
updated Nov. 1, 2019) (offering translations of the Turkmen constitution and various codes 
of law in both Russian and Turkmen). 
 90 Turkmenistan Civil Code of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, WOLTERS KLUWER, 
https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/store/product/turkmenistan-civil-code-of-saparmurat-
turkmenbashi/ [https://perma.cc/Y3BS-QW7F] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Compare TÜRKMENISTANYŇ RAÝAT KODEKSI [CIVIL CODE] art. 10 (Turkm.) 
(guaranteeing various judicial protections for civil rights, including the right to an appeal), 
with Ballantyne, supra note 8 (reporting that Unionmatex faced various barriers in the 
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V. Solutions 
A. Just Stop Signing These Contracts93 
Of course, the easiest and most intuitive way to not be bound by 
a forum selection clause is to never sign a contract that contains one.  
While this is a valid point, the reality is that parties continue to sign 
these agreements and do not show any signs of stopping.94  The 
 
Turkmen domestic courts, including that its request for an appeal was ignored). 
 93 While in Japan, I once spilled a bucket of water onto a tatami (woven straw) mat 
floor. A frantic online search for “what to do when you spill water on tatami” turned up a 
series of articles that all advised in some form, “whatever you do, don’t ever spill water on 
tatami.”  While it should be clear by now that the easiest way to avoid forum selection 
clauses is to never sign contracts that contain them, the primary purpose of this article is 
to explore the options of parties who have already entered into such contracts and for 
arbitrators who encounter such contracts. 
 94 Investment Treaty Arbitration Law, a popular database for investment-related 
arbitral decisions, shows that at least ten investment arbitration disputes dealing with 
contracts containing forum selection clauses have been published since 2018.  Because 
both parties must consent for an arbitral award to be published, it is likely that the number 
of cases heard involving forum selection clauses is much, much higher.  See INT’L ARB. 
L., https://www.italaw.com/ [https://perma.cc/MF3G-JPLT] (last visited Dec. 14, 2020); 
Publication of ICSID Decisions, supra note 41.  For recent, published international arbitral 
cases involving forum selection clauses, see Anglo Am. PLC v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/1, Award, ¶ 214 (Jan. 18, 2019) (involving a mining 
concession contract containing an exclusive forum selection clause for the courts of 
Venezuela); Glencore Fin. (Berm.) Ltd v. Plurinational State of Bol., UNCITRAL PCA 
Case No. 2016-39/AA641, Claimant’s Rejoinder on Jurisdictional Objections, ¶¶ 248–49 
(Jan. 20, 2019) (involving contracts containing mandatory ICC arbitration clauses); 
Belenergia S.A. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/40, Award, ¶ 157 (Aug. 6, 
2019) (involving a forum selection clause conferring jurisdiction upon Rome courts); 
Greentech Energy Sys. A/S et al. v. The Italian Republic, SCC Arbitration V (2015/095), 
Final Award, ¶ 214 (Dec. 23, 2018) (involving contacts containing exclusive forum 
selection clauses for the Court of Rome); Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (Japan) v. The Republic 
of India, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2017-37, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 219 (Apr. 29, 
2019) (involving a contract calling for Chennai, India as the exclusive forum for dispute 
resolution); Glencore Int’l A.G. & C.I. Prodeco S.A. v. Republic of Colom., ICSID Case 
No. ABR/16/6, Award, ¶ 948 (Aug. 2, 2019) (involving a mining concession contract 
containing a forum selection clause for the Colombian courts); CMC Muratori Cementisti 
CMC Di Ravenna SOC. Coop. et al. v. Republic of Mozam., ICSID Case No. ARB/17/39, 
Award, ¶ 237 (Oct. 24, 2019) (involving a forum selection clause for a tribunal constituted 
pursuant to the Cotonou Convention Arbitration Rules); Casinos Austria Int’l GmbH & 
Casinos Austria Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Caso No. ARB/14/32, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (June 29, 2018) (involving a forum selection clause for the courts 
of the Province of Salta, Italy); Gavrilović & Gavrilović d.o.o. v. Republic of Croat., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/39, Award, ¶ 416 n.575 (July 26, 2018) (involving a forum 
selection clause providing for resolution of disputes in the Regional Commercial Court in 
Zagreb); Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. V. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/4, 
2021 FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN ICSID DISPUTES 491 
reasons for parties entering into these contracts are varied and may 
depend on the unique facts of each individual case. 
As seen in Unionmatex, many of the disputes that end up in front 
of ICSID tribunals arise out of contracts worth millions of dollars 
that were entered into after a lengthy and competitive bidding 
process.95  Perhaps investors who have won a contract through a 
bidding war feel that their negotiating power is limited and that the 
government may move on to the next lowest bidder should the 
winning company push too hard for terms in the contract that are 
overly favorable to the investor.  Investors might also not appreciate 
the gravity of signing a forum selection clause for a foreign 
jurisdiction.96  
The courts of the world are as diverse as the countries that host 
them,97 and there is no database or objective ranking system to tell 
parties which nations’ judicial systems they can and cannot trust.98  
 
Award, ¶ 3.18 (Aug. 31, 2018) (involving a Sale and Purchase Agreement containing a 
mandatory arbitration clause for resolution of disputes in accordance with the Arbitration 
Rules of the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration [CRCICA 
Arbitration]). 
 95 Unionmatex’s €144 million contract was the result of winning a 2008 public 
tender, a bidding war for a contract from a public sector organization. See Ballantyne, 
supra note 8 (“The company says it was directly invited to bid by the Turkmen government 
and that its selection as winner of the tender was personally approved by President 
Berdimuhamedow.”). 
 96 Both because they might over-estimate the reliability of the courts they submit 
themselves to, or because they believe that those treaty claims guaranteed by the BIT, such 
as the protection against expropriation, will not be subject to any choice-of-forum 
clause(s). For an extended discussion of the latter, see infra Part V.C. 
 97 WORLD JUST. PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2019 8 (2019), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/ROLI-2019-Reduced.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/48YT-HZHR] (“The Index has been designed to be applied in countries 
with vastly different social, cultural, economic, and political systems. No society has ever 
attained—let alone sustained—a perfect realization of the rule of law. Every country faces 
the perpetual challenge of building and renewing the structures, institutions, and norms 
that can support and sustain a rule of law culture.”). 
 98 Currently, the closest thing to such a database is the World Justice Project’s Rule 
of Law Index. While the compilation is one step in the right direction, the publishers 
themselves acknowledge that “the rule of law is notoriously difficult to define and 
measure.”  The report is designed to look at the experience of an everyday citizen in each 
country, placing weight on individual testimony related to topics like the nation’s ability 
to control crime. These factors likely have little impact on a wealthy overseas investor and 
as such, the report is not a dependable reference for determining a nation’s investment 
climate. Additionally, the report is incomplete, containing data for only 126 countries. 
Reports for many African, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian countries (including 
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Additionally, the definition of what an “equitable” system looks like 
may differ depending on who you ask.99  Finally, if two parties have 
had prior successful dealings in the past, the investor may be less 
hesitant to sign a contract with a forum selection clause if it feels 
that there is a low risk that the other party will breach.  However, 
the focus of this paper is not to elaborate on the many reasons why 
investors should not sign contracts containing forum selection 
clauses or to try to justify the actions of those who do.  Instead, this 
paper aims to present and analyze the different routes that an 
investor who has signed such a contract or an arbitrator who finds 
herself arbitrating a dispute involving such a contract may pursue to 
ultimately achieve an equitable outcome. 
B. Flexible Interpretation100 
Drafting a quality forum selection clause is somewhat of an art, 
and a poorly worded contract may present an opportunity to wiggle 
around or out of an unfavorable forum selection clause.  This can be 
done by reading the clause as either (1) non-exclusive or (2) limited 
in its scope.101 
In order for a clause to be read as exclusive, it must contain 
certain words indicating that the forum listed in the contract is the 
only forum in which claims may be brought.102  A mandatory forum 
selection clause must contain language that indicates exclusivity, 
such as “sole,” “only,” “exclusive,” or “must.”103  With less of a 
 
Turkmenistan) are notoriously absent. See id. at 7–8, 17. 
 99 Even the U.S. judicial system, which is considered by many to be a highly 
developed legal system, is frowned upon in many European countries for its use of jury 
trials, which some see as being unreliable. See The Jury Is Out, ECONOMIST (Feb. 12, 
2009), https://www.economist.com/international/2009/02/12/the-jury-is-out [https:// 
perma.cc/8S4T-V6HA] (“Britain, the supposed mother of trial by jury, is seeking to scrap 
them for serious fraud and to ban juries from some inquests.”). 
 100 Note that the interpretive rules explained here are American interpretive rules. 
While other jurisdictions likely have similar rules in effect, there is no guarantee that 
foreign courts will interpret contract language exactly as U.S. courts do. 
 101 See Coyle, supra note 16, at 1795. 
 102 Id. at 1799. 
 103 Id. at 1800 (“Courts . . . will look for certain ‘magic words’ that signal the parties’ 
intent to litigate their disputes in the chosen forum to the exclusion of all other possible 
venues. The words ‘exclusive’ or ‘sole’ are generally recognized to convey this intent. 
Statements that a claim ‘must’ be brought in a particular forum or that it may ‘only’ be 
brought in that forum also suffice.”). 
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consensus, some courts have interpreted the terms “shall”104  and 
“venue”105 to indicate a mandatory forum selection clause.106  If the 
contract in question contains one or more of these terms, it will be 
difficult for either party to argue that the forum selection clause is 
non-exclusive. 
However, if a contract’s drafter neglected to include one of these 
terms, a forum selection clause may instead be read as being 
“permissive.”107  A permissive forum selection clause contains 
phrases like “the court shall have jurisdiction” or “the parties 
consent to venue.”108  Rather than mandating the forum in which a 
case must be brought, a permissive clause is understood instead to 
indicate a party’s consent to jurisdiction or venue in the specific 
forum.  This means that the forum selection clause, rather than 
mandating that the forum is the only place where a case can be 
brought, is instead read as the party agreeing to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the forum, making it one permissive place in which 
a case may be brought.109  While such clauses on their face may 
appear to signal binding forum selection, a party presented with a 
permissive clause may be able to argue its way out of a problematic 
forum and into a different forum of its choice. 
Even if a forum selection clause contains exclusive language 
making it binding, if the clause is not properly worded, it may still 
be found to be limited in its scope.110  U.S. courts have held that a 
clause referring to disputes “which arise out of this agreement” or 
“arising hereunder” are limited in their scope and extend only to 
 
 104 See Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1328–30 (11th Cir. 
2011) (holding the term shall as one of requirement). But see Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. 
Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 76–77 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the language “[t]he 
courts of California shall have jurisdiction . . . ” did not indicate a mandatory forum 
selection clause). 
 105 Gita Sports v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co. KG, 560 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436 
(W.D.N.C. 2008) (“A crucial distinction between a mandatory clause and a permissive 
clause ‘is whether the clause only mentions jurisdiction or specifically refers to venue.’”) 
(quoting Scotland Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Integrated Informatics, Inc., No. Civ. 
1:02CV00796, 2003 WL 151852, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2003)). 
 106 Coyle, supra note 16, at 1801. 
 107 Id. at 1802. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See id. at 1803. 
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contract claims.111  However, carefully worded forum selection 
clauses containing phrases like “all claims or causes of action 
relating to or arising from this agreement” or “any case or 
controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement” are 
broad enough in their scope to cover non-contract claims, such as 
tort claims.112  In the context of international investment disputes, 
an arbitral tribunal may find that an investor is bound to resolve 
contract disputes according to an exclusive forum selection 
clause.113  However, if the exclusive clause is not worded broadly 
enough with respect to its scope, the investor may be able to bring 
other, non-contract claims in another forum of its choice. 
C. Treat the Arbitration Provisions of BITs as Non-
Waivable114 
As explained supra Part III.A, BITs typically extend a number 
of protections to both parties, such as the protection against 
expropriation without compensation and a guarantee of certain 
standards of protection.115  A forum selection clause, no matter how 
cleverly worded, will generally not be interpreted as eliminating a 
tribunal’s jurisdiction over those treaty claims enumerated in the 
 
 111 Id. at 1805. 
 112 Coyle, supra note 16, at 1804. 
 113 See, e.g., Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal (formerly 
Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 
Award, ¶ 79 (Nov. 21, 2000). 
 114 The interplay between choice-of-forum provisions, ICSID jurisdiction, BITs, as 
well as the characterization of treaty versus contract claims, and the role and interpretation 
of umbrella clauses in ISDS is a complicated and highly specialized area of international 
arbitration law which many a more qualified author has explored in depth. See generally, 
e.g., Jude Antony, Umbrella Clauses Since SGS v Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines – A 
Developing Consensus, 29 ARB. INT’L 607 (2013); Stephen Donnelly, Conflicting Forum-
Selection Agreements in Treaty and Contract, 69 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 759 (2020); Mary E. 
Footer, Umbrella Clauses and Widely-Formulated Arbitration Clauses: Discerning the 
Limits of ICSID Jurisdiction, 16 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 87 (2017). This 
author does not purport to be an expert on this subject, nor does this section purport to 
provide an exhaustive or authoritative history of relevant ICSID decisions. Rather than 
serving as a practical guide, this section seeks to explore the normative implications of 
several well-known ICSID decisions relating to the issue of choice-of-forum clauses and 
ICSID jurisdiction. 
 115 See Aydoğmuş, supra note 54; Ross, supra note 10 (“[Unionmatex] accuses 
Turkmenistan of the deliberate breach of various protections in the BIT including the 
protection against expropriation without compensation and against unfair and inequitable 
treatment . . . ”). 
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BIT.116  In the case that Unionmatex is found bound to resolve any 
and all breach of contract claims it has in the Turkmen courts, it 
should in theory still be able to seek a remedy in front of an arbitral 
tribunal if it can successfully characterize Turkmenistan’s actions 
as treaty violations under the Germany-Turkmenistan BIT.117 
However, in certain similar cases, investors have been unable to 
bring their treaty claims in front of an ICSID tribunal because of a 
forum selection clause contained in a private contract granting 
exclusive jurisdiction to domestic courts.  Vivendi v. Argentine 
Republic,118 another case involving the “novel and complex 
issue . . . relating to the interplay of a bilateral investment treaty, a 
Concession Contract with a forum-selection clause and the ICSID 
Convention[,]” provides an example of the injustice Unionmatex 
may face depending on the decision of the ICSID tribunal.119   
Similar to Unionmatex, Vivendi involved a multi-million dollar 
concession contract between a foreign investor and a State entity, 
(in the case of Vivendi, the Argentine provincial government).120  
After its relationship with the Argentine government soured, the 
French investor in Vivendi sought a remedy from an ICSID tribunal 
under the Argentine-French BIT, alleging various violations of the 
BIT and the concession contract.121  Article 8 of the Argentine-
French BIT deals generally with disputes “relating to investments 
made under this Agreement between one Contracting Party and an 
investor of the other Contracting Party[,]”122 though scholars are 
inconclusive as to whether this language constitutes an umbrella 
clause.123 
 
 116 See Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 79. 
 117 See id.; see also Garanti Koza v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No ARB/11/20, 
Award, ¶ 245 (Dec. 19, 2016) (“The fact that the Contract provides for resolution of 
disputes arising under the Contract in the Arbitration Court of Turkmenistan does not 
deprive this Tribunal of jurisdiction over claims pleaded and arising under the BIT.”). 
 118 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Vivendi Universal (formerly 
Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3. 
 119 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 95. 
 120 See id. ¶ 9. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. ¶ 55 (quoting Article 8(1) of the Argentina – France BIT). 
 123 Argentina – France BIT (1991), UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB (Mar. 2016), 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bit/127/ 
argentina---france-bit-1991- [https://perma.cc/J3HB-F8U7] (reporting that it is 
“inconclusive” whether the Argentine-French BIT contains an umbrella clause). 
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In its findings on jurisdiction, the tribunal held that the forum 
selection clause of the concession contract124 “does not, and indeed 
could not, exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the BIT” 
because the forum selection clause could only affect those causes of 
actions deriving from the concession contract, but not those arising 
under the BIT.125  However, the tribunal went on to find that, 
because all of the causes of action the investors alleged under the 
BIT were “closely linked to the performance or non-performance of 
the parties under the Concession Contract”: 
[I]t is not possible for this Tribunal to determine which actions of 
the Province were taken in exercise of its sovereign authority and 
which in the exercise of its rights as a party to the Concession 
Contract . . . To make such determinations the Tribunal would 
have to undertake a detailed interpretation and application of the 
Concession Contract, a task left by the parties to that contract to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative courts of 
Tucumán.126 
Though the award in Vivendi was later challenged and partially 
annulled, the outcome and logic followed in Vivendi foreshadowed 
the outcome of other, similar cases of ISDS and contracts containing 
forum selection clauses.127 
Indeed, several decisions since Vivendi have reached similar 
 
 124 “For purposes of interpretation and application of this Contract the parties submit 
themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Contentious Administrative Tribunals of 
Tucumán.” Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 27 (Nov. 21, 2000). 
 125 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 14(b) (July 3, 
2002). 
 126 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 79. 
 127 The foreign investor in Vivendi later challenged the validity of the tribunal’s 
decision and sought an annulment from the ICSID annulment committee. The committee 
agreed that the tribunal’s refusal to interpret the concession contract constituted an excess 
of power, nullifying that portion of the Vivendi decision. The committee reasoned that, 
“whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of 
contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to 
its own proper or applicable law—in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case 
of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the contract, in other words, the law of 
Tucumán.” See Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶14(d); see 
also Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID 
Decision on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 839 (2005). 
However, this decision left unanswered the issue of reliance on a contractual 
compromissory clause in cases “where the essential basis of a claim brought before an 
international tribunal is a breach of contract.” Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 98; see also Shany supra, at 839. 
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outcomes regarding the interplay between ICSID jurisdiction and 
exclusive forum selection clauses contained in concession 
contracts.  In the 2002 case SGS v. Pakistan128 the tribunal was asked 
to consider a dispute arising under the Pakistani-Swiss BIT and a 
contract containing a choice of forum clause that barred ICSID from 
hearing the dispute.129  While the tribunal entertained the Swiss 
investor’s traditional treaty claims, it refused to hear any of the 
company’s contract claims—despite the existence of an umbrella 
clause in the BIT—130 and upheld the Pakistani arbitrator’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over those claims.131 
The following year, an ICSID tribunal took things a step further 
in SGS v. Philippines,132 a case presenting similar jurisdictional 
issues to Vivendi and SGS v. Pakistan.133  Unlike the tribunal in SGS 
v. Pakistan, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines accepted a broader 
interpretation of the umbrella clause in the Swiss-Philippine BIT 
(which contained virtually identical language to the one at issue in 
SGS v. Pakistan) and held that the tribunal had broad jurisdiction 
over both contract and treaty claims.  However, channeling Vivendi, 
the tribunal refused to hear the case on the merits, finding both the 
 
 128 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/13. 
 129 See SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 43–46 (Aug. 6, 2003). 
 130 “Either Contacting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the 
commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the other Contracting 
Party.”  Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Switz.-Pak., art. 11, opened for 
signature Nov. 7, 1995 (entered into force June 5, 1996), (English translation of the BIT 
available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/ 
treaty-files/2130/download [https://perma.cc/C5ZL-BQG8]); see also Pakistan-
Switzerland BIT (1995), UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB (Nov. 2016), https://investm 
entpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bit/2721/pakistan---
switzerland-bit-1995- [https://perma.cc/FVX6-XUH4] (reporting that the Pakistan-
Switzerland BIT contains an umbrella clause). 
 131 See SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 166–74; see also Shany, supra note 127, at 840–41. It should 
be noted that Pakistan relied heavily on the Vivendi award and subsequent annulment in 
its submissions, as did the tribunal in its Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction. See 
generally SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction. 
 132 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6. 
 133 See Shany, supra note 127, at 841. 
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treaty and elevated contract claims inadmissible.  The tribunal ruled 
that it: 
‘should not exercise its jurisdiction over a contractual 
claim when the parties have already agreed on how such 
a claim is to be resolved, and have done so exclusively.’  
Given the strong links between the contract claim and the 
treaty claim (whose independent existence [the tribunal] 
doubted), the majority held that it would be ‘inappropriate 
and premature’ to address the treaty claim before the 
contract claim had been adjudicated by the contractually 
designated courts.  It therefore decided to stay the ICSID 
arbitration proceedings until the contract claim was sorted 
out.134 
Following this same logic, in 2009 the tribunal in BIVAC v. 
Paraguay135 found that the tribunal had jurisdiction over both 
traditional treaty claims and contract claims elevated to treaty-claim 
status by the umbrella clause contained in the relevant BIT.136  
However, the tribunal concluded that claims arising under the 
umbrella clause were inadmissible because “BIVAC cannot rely on 
the Contract as the basis of a claim . . . when the Contract itself 
refers that claim exclusively to another forum.”137 
In practice, this series of ICSID decisions all in some form or 
another denied the ICSID tribunal jurisdiction to hear treaty claims, 
despite the tribunals’ insistence that forum selection clauses in 
private contracts may not be read to deprive the tribunal of its ability 
to hear claims arising under the BIT.138   This is equally concerning 
 
 134 Id. at 842 (quoting SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of 
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 155–62 (Jan. 29, 2004)). 
 135 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control BIVAC B.V v. 
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. Arb/07/9. 
 136 BIVAC, ICSID Case No. Arb/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 159 (May 29, 2009). 
 137 Id. 
 138 In 2013, Jude Antony published a paper surveying ICSID decisions post-SGS v. 
Philippines involving umbrella clauses and their impact on ICSID jurisdiction. Antony 
supra note 114, at 607. His research uncovered an emerging trend in ICSID decisions in 
line with the position advocated for in the paper. Id. at 625-28 (finding one case post-SGS 
v. Philippines where the tribunal held no jurisdiction because the contractual forum 
selection clause took precedence (Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of 
Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12), two cases where the tribunal had jurisdiction but 
the claims were inadmissible (SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6; BIVAC, 
ICSID Case No. Arb/07/9), and eight cases where tribunals considered their ability to hear 
a claim under the umbrella clause unaffected by the presence of a contractual forum 
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both in the case of traditional treaty claims and in disputes arising 
out of BITs containing umbrella clauses, where ordinary contract 
claims are elevated to the level of treaty claims.  If an ICSID tribunal 
finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear BIT claims, or that the 
tribunal has jurisdiction but that such claims are inadmissible, 
parties are effectively allowed to contract around international 
treaties and waive the supposedly non-waivable protections these 
treaties offer.  Arbitrators may address this issue by treating the right 
to have treaty claims heard by an international tribunal as non-
waivable (not just in theory, but in practice) by allowing no part of 
a treaty claim, whether a traditional treaty claim or a contract claim 
elevated to treaty status through an umbrella clause, to be removed 
from the scope of the tribunal’s decision by private contract. 
D. Forum Non Conveniens 
Forum non conveniens is one way in which a party may 
challenge a court’s ability to hear a case, even if the contract signed 
by the parties contains an exclusive forum selection clause.  
Literally “an inconvenient forum,” forum non conveniens is not a 
challenge to jurisdiction but rather a preliminary determination that 
another, different forum is more appropriate to hear a case.139  
However, for two reasons, forum non conveniens is unlikely to 
 
selection clause in an underlying contract (SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. 
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. 
(formerly Enron Corp.) & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3; LG&E Energy Corp. et al v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1; 
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8; Salini Costruttori S.p.A. 
& Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13; 
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3; Sempra 
Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16; Eureko B.V. v. Republic 
of Poland)) (excluding non-ICSID decisions). Antony notes that, despite a strong, 
developing consensus “that the jurisdiction of an international arbitral Tribunal to hear 
umbrella clause claims is unaffected by the presence of a contractual forum selection 
clause in an underling contract . . . there have been cases holding either that the Tribunal 
did not have jurisdiction in this situation, or that it had jurisdiction but the claim was 
inadmissible[.] Id. at 638. While these make up a minority of cases surveyed, “some of 
these decisions are recent, and this interpretation is also supported by two of the three cases 
decided since the comprehensive review conducted for this paper, so it is not possible to 
dismiss this line of jurisprudence as having died out.” Id. at 638–39 (referring to the 
decisions in Bosh Int’l, Inc. et al. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11; and Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. et al. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11). 
 139 See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 428. 
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provide a remedy in international investment disputes. 
First, in a forum non conveniens analysis, U.S. courts140 consider 
a range of factors to determine whether the forum is proper.141  The 
court gives particular weight to “the convenience to the parties and 
the practical difficulties that can attend the adjudication of a dispute 
in a certain locality.”142  Because forum selection clauses in 
international investment contracts tend to select the courts of the 
developing nation where the majority of the events relevant to the 
dispute likely took place and where the majority of witnesses likely 
reside, most courts would not feel compelled to send the case 
elsewhere.143 
Second, forum non conveniens is a doctrine traditionally 
recognized at common law.144  This means that a court in the United 
States, England, Canada, or another common law jurisdiction might 
entertain a forum non conveniens argument, but that the courts of a 
developing nation likely would not.145  While forum non conveniens 
might provide an out to a forum selection clause in other 
circumstances, in the case of investment disputes like that of 
Unionmatex, the doctrine is unlikely to provide any relief 
whatsoever. 
E. Introduce a Zapata-like Standard 
When confronted with a forum selection clause in a contract, an 
arbitral tribunal may look at the scope and exclusivity of the clause, 
 
 140 Note that the rules explained in this section apply specifically to U.S. courts. The 
test for a forum non conveniens claim may look different in another jurisdiction. 
 141 See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 428. 
 142 Id. (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996)). 
 143 See generally, e.g., Unionmatex, supra note 6 (providing one such example, where 
the majority of events took place in Turkmenistan, the witnesses all reside in 
Turkmenistan, and the choice clauses in the contract selected both Turkmen courts and 
Turkmen law). 
 144 See id. (describing forum non conveniens as a common law doctrine). 
 145 Common law jurisdictions include England and most territories that were once 
British colonies, including the United States. However, as most developing nations were 
not once British colonies, most do not recognize common law doctrines like forum non 
conveniens. See Key Features of Common Law or Civil Law Systems, WORLD BANK GRP., 
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/legislation-regulation/framework-
assessment/legal-systems/common-vs-civil-law [https://perma.cc/LCU6-6KA8] (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2019).  ICSID tribunals do entertain forum non conveniens arguments. 
See, e.g., Rockhopper Italia S.p.A. et al. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14, 
Decision on the Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection, ¶ 34 (June 26, 2019). 
2021 FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN ICSID DISPUTES 501 
but makes no inquiry into whether the clause should be enforced in 
the first place.  In the case of M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Company,146 the U.S. Supreme Court developed a standard by 
which to measure the equitability of enforcing a jurisdiction clause. 
Under the Zapata standard, a court inquires whether a “trial in 
the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient 
that [the plaintiff] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his 
day in court” or whether the clause should be found “invalid for 
such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”147  This sets a high standard 
which may be difficult for a U.S. plaintiff arguing against a forum 
selection clause for a U.S. jurisdiction to meet.148  However, were 
ICSID to adopt a similar analysis, forum selection clauses for 
developing nations with weak or corrupt legal systems could 
possibly be held invalid for effectively depriving parties of their 
“day in court.”149 
Take Unionmatex, for example—how would a forum selection 
clause for the courts of Turkmenistan hold up to a Zapata analysis?  
The 2018 Human Rights Report of Turkmenistan reveals serious 
problems within the nation’s judicial system.150  The report states 
that although Turkmen law provides for an independent judiciary, 
in reality the branch is controlled by the executive branch; the 
president has sole power to appoint and dismiss judges with no 
judicial review.151  Trials are rife with due process violations, 
including failure to provide interpreters, no presumption of 
innocence, a lack of independent lawyers, and general procedural 
 
 146 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 147 Id. at 15, 18. 
 148 In Zapata, the court went as far as to hold that it would not be overly inconvenient 
for a Houston-based American company to be bound to a forum selection clause in 
London. Id. at 17 (“[S]election of a London forum was clearly a reasonable effort to bring 
vital certainty to this international transaction and to provide a neutral forum experienced 
and capable in the resolution of admiralty litigation.”). 
 149 Strictly speaking, an ICSID tribunal cannot create common law. While ICSID 
decisions are not binding, it is common to see one tribunal applying standards that were 
created by tribunals in previous cases. One of the most common examples is the Salini test 
for determining whether an investment qualifies for ICSID jurisdictional purposes. See 
Salini Construttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 43–58 (July 23, 2001). 
 150 See U.S. DEPT. OF ST., TURKMENISTAN 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 6–9 (2019), 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TURKMENISTAN-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VZR3-2DCD]. 
 151 Id. at 6. 
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violations such as not allowing a defendant’s lawyer to present 
exculpatory evidence or question witnesses.152  Generally, 
Turkmenistan’s judicial branch is “widely reputed to be corrupt and 
inefficient.”153 
These descriptions match closely with Unionmatex’s 
experience with the Turkmen court system: 
The German company says it was denied due process in the court 
proceedings, having been hindered from bringing a translator to 
the oral hearing.  It also alleges its local legal representative 
resigned from the case before the hearing following extreme 
pressure from the Turkmen government.  Further court actions 
brought by the company failed or were ignored, it says.154 
Under these circumstances, it would not be a stretch to 
characterize Unionmatex’s experience with the Turkmen judicial 
system as, for all practical purposes, depriving it of its day in court.  
One would imagine that, under the Zapata standard, a U.S. court 
would hold a forum selection clause invalid if it condemned a party 
to adjudicate in a forum where it would have no translator, no 
representation, and no practical right to appeal.  However, arbitral 
tribunals currently have no such standard.155  All forum selection 
clauses are treated as valid, no matter how egregious, and the court’s 
analysis extends only to determining the exclusivity and scope of 
the clause. 
This seems especially concerning in cases involving disputes on 
an international scale where the forums that may be selected are far 
more diverse and may be more prone to corruption.  The Zapata 
standard was created by and is exclusively used by U.S. courts.156  
 
 152 Id. at 6–7 
 153 Id. at 6. 
 154 Ballantyne, supra note 8. 
 155 Currently, the only standard resembling the Zapata standard in arbitral tribunals is 
the futility doctrine, which may be applied to the requirement that certain remedies be 
exhausted before a tribunal can grant jurisdiction to hear a case. According to principles 
of international law, the requirement to exhaust other remedies before submitting to 
arbitration can be waived if it can be shown that no remedy is available, or an attempt at 
exhaustion would be futile. This is an insurmountably high standard as the tribunal in Kiliç 
held that, despite rampant corruption and due process violations in Turkmen courts, the 
claimant failed to show that such proceedings would be “futile.”  Further, the futility 
doctrine has been applied only in the case of exhaustion requirements, not to the 
enforceability of forum selection clauses generally. See Kiliç, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1 
at ¶¶ 3.4.1–3.4.36. 
 156 See generally Zapata, 407 U.S. 1. 
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While it is one step in the right direction for U.S. courts to recognize 
that forum selection clauses can be problematic for parties, the harm 
and inconvenience that will come from one party litigating in one 
U.S. forum as opposed to another U.S. forum is insignificant 
compared to that which can arise from one party being forced to 
litigate in a remote, developing nation.  Under current arbitral rules 
and precedent, an arbitral tribunal would conduct no analysis of the 
enforceability of a forum selection clause for the courts of, say, 
Somalia or North Korea,157 but would instead only analyze the 
exclusivity and scope of said clause. 
VI. Conclusion 
International institutions have developed a solution in response 
to the increased globalization of commerce, business, and the 
resulting litigation over the last half a century: international arbitral 
institutions.158  The arbitral process is tailor-made to suit the needs 
of large-scale businesses and investors and to create a neutral forum 
in which diverse parties can have their disputes resolved in a fair, 
predictable, and efficient process.159  The importance of these 
tribunals is further solidified by their inclusion in the terms of the 
thousands160 of BITs which countries have signed.161  However, 
when forum selection clauses in private contracts prevent arbitral 
institutions from hearing the claims they’re designed to resolve or 
prevent BITs from protecting the interests of parties they’re 
designed to protect, the result is inequity. 
Unionmatex is still waiting for a determination of whether the 
ICSID tribunal will grant jurisdiction to hear its case and which 
claims the forum selection clause does or does not prevent the 
tribunal from hearing.162  If the tribunal, following the logic of the 
 
 157 Both of which are currently perceived to be two of the most corruption nations in 
the world. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 [https://perma.cc/MPF8-5MR5] (last visited Nov. 
24, 2019). 
 158 See Robin, supra note 36, at 136–38. 
 159 See id. 
 160 Yackee, supra note 18, at 401 (“Since 1959, states have signed over 2500 broadly 
similar agreements[.]”). 
 161 See id. at 403 (“BITs [began] to routinely couple . . . substantive promises with an 
important procedural guarantee: the right of the investor to initiate binding, enforceable 
international arbitration against the host state for alleged treaty breaches.”). 
 162 Case Details, supra note 12. 
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Vivendi line of decisions, finds that the forum selection clause bars 
it from hearing any contract claims and that the alleged breaches of 
the Turkmen government under the BIT are strictly contract claims 
or too interwoven with the performance of the contract for the 
tribunal to hear independently, Unionmatex will have no further 
recourse.  It will be bound to the judgment of the Turkmen courts, 
which decided the outcome of Unionmatex’s future with no 
translator, no legal representation, and no opportunity for appeal.163 
Lawyers who are asked to represent clients in this situation can 
do some clever arguing to try to limit the scope or exclusivity of a 
forum selection clause or try to avoid the clause altogether by 
characterizing an investor’s loss as a breach of treaty, rather than a 
breach of contract.  However, arbitral institutions are in the best 
situation to resolve this issue.  When presented with a case involving 
a contract containing a forum selection clause, the tribunal might 
avoid injustice by asking one simple preliminary question: would 
enforcement of this forum selection clause result in an inequitable 
outcome?  Further, while tribunals might like to characterize 
protections of BITs as non-waivable, allowing parties to reserve part 
or all of an ICSID case to be heard in domestic courts in practice 
creates an effective waiver of supposedly non-waivable treaty 
protections.  Tribunals might avoid this loophole simply by 
allowing no part of a claim arising under a BIT to be delegated away 





 163 See Ballantyne, supra note 8. 
